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What determines commercial banks’ demand for 
reserves in the interbank market? 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 30/2007 
Michal Kempa 




In this paper I analyse the determinants of commercial banks’ demand for reserves 
in the interbank market. I first document the pattern in the Eurosystem, where 
banks deviate from the required reserves balance at the start of the maintenance 
period only to meet the requirements closer to the settlement day. Using my 
model I show that this behaviour can be explained by certain trade-related 
frictions and costs. Examples include potential extra expenses tied to large 
transactions or the asymmetry between the cost of borrowing and profits from 
lending. I also find that borrowing decisions can be largely unaffected by current 
liquidity, which has important implications for the implementation of central bank 
monetary policy: in order to influence the level of interest rates, the central bank 
must focus on controlling market expectations. 
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Liikepankkien reservien kysynnän määräytyminen 
pankkien välisillä markkinoilla 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 30/2007 
Michal Kempa 




Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan reservien kysyntää määrääviä tekijöitä pankkien vä-
lisillä markkinoilla. Tarkastelujen aluksi tutkimuksessa dokumentoidaan euro-
järjestelmän liikepankkien tapa poiketa reservivaatimuksista reservien ylläpito-
periodin alussa ja täyttää nämä vaatimukset vasta lähempänä tilityspäivää. Tämän 
jälkeen työssä osoitetaan, että eurojärjestelmän liikepankkien käyttäytyminen 
voidaan selittää pankkien välistä kaupankäyntiä vaikeuttavilla kitkatekijöillä ja 
kustannuksilla. Tällaiset kitka- ja kustannustekijät voivat liittyä esimerkiksi suur-
ten kaupankäyntimäärien aiheuttamiin kustannuksiin tai lainanoton kustannusten 
ja lainanannon tuottojen epäsymmetrisyyteen. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen malli on 
muutoin suhteellisen tavanomainen ja yleisesti käytetty aihepiirin muissa tutki-
muksissa. Tulosten mukaan pankkien lainanottopäätökset ovat lisäksi lähes täysin 
riippumattomia niiden likviditeettiasemasta. Tämä tulos on tärkeä rahapolitiikan 
toteutuksen kannalta, koska vaikuttaakseen markkinoiden korkotasoon, keskus-
pankin tulisi keskittyä markkinoiden odotusten hallintaan. 
 
Avainsanat: rahamarkkinat, eonia, likviditeettivaikutus 
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Commercial banks use the interbank market to trade funds that are used
in daily payments and to satisfy the reserve requirement. Banks choose
their demand (or supply) for funds, based on their individual liquidity and
expectations of the future interest rate. This market is very important for
the central bank, since the average transaction rate is used as the benchmark
for the interest rate in the economy and therefore regarded a perfect tool to
implement monetary policy.
This paper models the behavior of the interbank interest rate. The focus is
on the issues indicated in Kempa (2006), where I found that under standard (in
the literature) assumptions of risk neutrality, ﬁxed expectations and certain,
market speciﬁc conditions commercial banks’ demand for funds cannot be
uniquely determined undermining the eﬀectiveness of central bank policy.
Here, I ﬁnd that market related frictions and trading costs might be used
to explain the evolution of reserves demand along the maintenance period and
link market liquidity and interest rate.
The interbank market has been analyzed quite extensively before. Perhaps
t h em o s ti n ﬂuential contribution was Poole (1968) who linked the interest
rate and market liquidity in a form of demand equation: the interest rate
is equal to the expected cost of using standing facilities. More recently
Hamilton (1996) was the ﬁrst to state, the so called, martingale hypothesis:
since the reserve requirement can be satisﬁed on any day of the maintenance
period the funds should be perfect substitutes. But then to avoid arbitrage
opportunities, the current interest rate must equal the expected rate in the
future (it = E(it+1)) rather than depend on market liquidity. This would have
a profound impact on the central bank operating policy as it would cut the link
between market operations (targeting liquidity) and target interest rate. This
hypothesis was rejected by Hamilton (1996) himself for the US market and he
attributed the deviation to the transaction costs and trade limits. Later on
Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) and Välimäki (2003) analyzed
systems with reserve requirement averaging provision and using Eurosystem
framework showed that the martingale hypothesis can be rejected even in the
absence of market frictions. Banks are willing to pay extra to avoid, so called,
a lock-in state, where the reserve requirement is satisﬁed and any positive
balance is left to be deposited at the central bank at penalty rate. This
results in increasing level of the interest rate toward the end of maintenance
period which was indeed observed before introduction of Euro. Gaspar et
al (2004) document the increasing volatility of interest rate toward the end
of the maintenance period and explain it using a modiﬁed standard model
with heterogeneity and trading groups. Similar models of interbank market
for the US were constructed by Bartolinie ta l( 2 0 0 1 ) ,B a r t o l i n ie ta l( 2 0 0 2 ) ,
Bartolini and Prati (2003) and Clouse and Dow Jr (2002) where they included
US-speciﬁc market features (such as carry-over provision).
The structure of the aforementioned papers is similar: banks determine the
demand for reserves by balancing the cost of market funds with the expected
cost of using central bank’s standing facilities as in the original Poole (1968)
paper. Market speciﬁc features (such as averaging provision) are then used
7to explain the deviation from martingale hypothesis that was indeed observed
on the interbank markets in the late 90s. However in the Eurosystem, this
deviation does not hold any more, as documented in empirical papers of Würtz
(2003) and Moschitz (2004) where they fail to ﬁnd any systematic pattern in
the average interest rate on diﬀerent days of the maintenance period. This
leads to a discrepancy between empirical and theoretical results.
Before discarding the standard model note that Pérez-Quirós and
Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) as well as other researchers assume that the
uncertainty faced by the commercial banks is substantial and the volatility
of so called liquidity shock — explained a bit later in detail — is equal to the
average current account holding. With overdrafts forbidden, the buﬀer oﬀered
by reserve requirement is highly valued and its price is included in the market
rate.
In my own paper Kempa (2006) I looked into the actual size of the liquidity
shock. Using the standard model and estimates of the parameters for the
Eurosystem I showed that the liquidity shock volatility is actually relatively
small compared with the average current account value (around 10%). For
commercial banks that means that the probability of using the standing
facilities is very low and current interest rate is mainly driven by the expected
level in the future. The no-overdraft condition is hardly binding and hence
the beneﬁt of reserve requirement buﬀer stressed by previous researchers is
barely considered when deciding about trade volume. If the current interest
rate is equal to the expected one, provided the bank’s reserves are suﬃcient its
borrowing decisions have no impact on the bank’s proﬁta st h er e v e n u e sf r o m
lending one euro today is equal exactly to the expected cost of borrowing one
euro tomorrow.
The fact that the borrowing value cannot be uniquely determined within
the framework of that model is a shortcoming from the perspective of central
bankers that need to decide on the allotment size in the open market
operations. If the banks are indiﬀerent between keeping diﬀerent reserves at
the same interest rate, the market becomes partially immune to the liquidity
conditions and the interest rate becomes driven mainly by the expectations.
Central banks can control liquidity (by open market operations) but controlling
expectations is much more tricky especially in the periods of unrest. The issue
of the demand determinants is then of crucial importance for the eﬀectiveness
of operating policy.
This paper focuses on other than simple proﬁt maximization determinants
of the reserves demand of the commercial banks answering several additional
questions. Is there any speciﬁc pattern the banks follow during maintenance
period? How important for banks are the standing facilities? How can be the
demand modeled with the current interest rates equal to expected level (as the
empirical data suggest)? And ﬁnally, what is the impact of the central bank
allotment on the behavior of the market?
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents the data for
the sample of Eurosystem banks and their actual reserve demand for a period
of 2,5 years. I compare the actual liquidity holding to the required reserves,
and it seems there is an interesting pattern: the banks tend to deviate from
8the required level at the start, and compensate for it in the latter part of the
maintenance period.
Section 3 contains the standard in the literature model of the interbank
interest rate based on Poole (1968) and later modiﬁcations. I also illustrate
t h em a r t i n g a l eh y p o t h e s i sa n di t si m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h em a r k e tb e h a v i o r .
Section 4 contains the modiﬁcations to the original model, together with a
Monte-Carlo simulation study. When looking at the reserve demand, the basic
benchmark is of course the required reserve requirement but apart from that,
I analyse other potential candidates that can play a signiﬁcant role:
• existence of trading cost
• incentives to avoid excess trading
• increasing marginal borrowing cost
• asymmetry between borrowing costs and lending proﬁts
The trading cost (suggested initially by Hamilton, 1996) might be the result
of obligatory collateral (in case of secured transactions) or matching problems
(cost of ﬁnding parties willing to trade). Avoiding volatility seems natural
assumption that holds on most ﬁnancial market and interbank is not exception
here. As for increasing the marginal cost, excess borrowing on the interbank
market might send a negative signal to other participants suggesting the
bank faces liquidity problems and inﬂuence bank’s reputation. Also increased
borrowing cost is not likely to be matched by increased proﬁts from lending
creating certain asymmetry. All those issues are discussed in much more detail
below.
The results of the simulation roughly follow the patterns documented in
section 2. I ﬁnd that including market related frictions and trading costs
might indeed play signiﬁcant role in the reserves demand and yields result
that resemble the actual behavior of the Eurosystem.
92 Reserve demand of Eurosystem banks
This section contains a brief overview of the interbank market. The market is
unique in many aspects and often overlooked or confused with regular bonds or
stocks market. Later on I also present the data on the bank behavior obtained
from the ECB.
2.1 Interbank market
The interbank market is used by commercial banks to trade overnight reserves
t h a ta r et h e ns t o r e do nt h ea c c o u n ti nt h ec e n t r a lb a n k . 1 During the day, those
reserves facilitate liquidity ﬂows and transfers between the banks resulting
from transactions between their customers (see below). It is however only the
ﬁnal end of the day balance that can be used to satisfy obligatory reserve
requirement.
The reserve requirement is typically linked to the balance sheet of the bank
and is known at the start of maintenance period. In many countries (including
the Eurosystem), an averaging provision is used meaning the average (during
maintenance period) rather that ﬁxed reserves must be stored on the account
in the central bank. Also required reserves are remunerated. The banking
sector obtains the required liquidity from the central bank during open market
operations that are either long term (1 month and more maturity) or short term
(1 week maturity). The rate at which the required reserves are remunerated
is closely linked with the rate of open market operations, hence central bank
makes zero proﬁt on that operations. Correspondingly, commercial banks bear
no cost of the reserve requirement.
Each day commercial banks are processing large number of transactions.
Since their number is so signiﬁcant however, there are likely to be statistically
signiﬁcant patterns that can be anticipated in advance. For example mortgage
bank can very well model loans repayments and modify their actions on the
interbank market accordingly. From the bank perspective then, those liquidity
movements should pose little problems in terms of meeting end of the day
balance target. Even though certain ﬂows drive the majority of the trade on
the interbank market, in this paper I am interested in the random, unexpected
transactions that require the bank to take extra measures. The reason is, those
are more likely to have an impact on the behavior of the interest rate as will
be explained later on.
In general, those random distortions are idiosyncratic, and I have decided
to divide them into:
• those happening before the end of the trading
• those happening after the trading day is over
The ﬁrst type result mainly from large, unexpected payments orders made
by the customers that under some assumptions can be easily oﬀset on the
1Excellent description of various aspects of the interbank market and monetary policy
implementation can be found in Bindseil (2004).
10interbank market. Take for example two banks that start at the liquidity
levels they ﬁnd optimal for the purpose of satisfying reserve requirement.
When an unexpected payment order occurs between those two, it will force
one of them above and the other below optimal liquidity level which will create
incentives for trade. Assuming no trade restrictions, transaction just reverting
that payment order (returning banks to the optimal liquidity level) is the most
proﬁtable but also means early liquidity changes have no impact on the end of
the day balance. The case where the restrictions are present is the main focus
of this paper and is discussed in detail in section 4.
The customers orders have no impact on the aggregate market liquidity as
they only result in liquidity ﬂows between banks themselves. There are however
also other operations, such as cash withdrawal or transfers to government
accounts that have an impact on the aggregate market liquidity. Often referred
to as ‘changes to autonomous liquidity factors’ they remain closely monitored
by the central banks. The balance of those transactions is the benchmark
against which the allotment (in open market operations) is decided. In case
o ft h eE u r o s y s t e m ,t h eE C Bh a se m p l o y e dt h ep o l i c yo fe x a c to ﬀsetting that
changes, maintaining the market liquidity at stable level, equal to the aggregate
reserve requirement. Historically the ECB has achieved high accuracy in
predictions of market liquidity hence I decided not to deal with them in this
paper and just assume the aggregate liquidity remains on constant level. An
exception is scenario where I analyse the impact of the liquidity shortage in
the market behavior discussed later on.
Finally there are changes to bank balances that cannot be oﬀset on the
interbank market, mainly because they happen after the trading day is over.
Those are regarded far more interesting as they determine banks ﬁnal day
reserve holdings and ultimately reserve demand. When deciding its market
participation value, the bank must take into account that it might be hit by a
negative shock that exceeds its current account balance and will force the use
of central bank standing facilities at penalty rates.
It is important to distinguish between commercial bank behavior on the
interbank market and its regular activities (customer loans, assets management
etc.) and those two aspects should be regarded separately as they refer to
diﬀerent time scale. The interbank market does not provide the liquidity
for new customer loans that have typically longer maturities. Increasing
customers deposits will eventually result in higher reserve requirement in the
next maintenance period but the liquidity needed for that can be however
easily obtained in open market operations at nearly no additional cost (since
the required reserves are remunerated at the same rate as liquidity supply
operations). This essentially means there is no direct link between interbank
and other activities performed by commercial bank.
2.2 Eurosystem banks
The interbank market is a closed market and in the Eurosystem the aggregate
reserves value is close to aggregate reserve requirement. What that means is
one bank decision to front-load (maintain higher balance of current account
11than required reserves) must be reﬂected in other bank’s decision to back-load.
When looking at market data, those two banks behavior will simply net each
other, hence to observe those patterns one needs to look at individual data.
The sample obtained from the ECB includes information about 71
commercial banks, their current account balances and corresponding reserve
requirement for the period 24 January 2003 — 31 May 2005.2 That means, only
end of the day positions are known but not the daily operations throughout
the day or trade volume. The sample has been selected from all Eurosystem
countries by choosing a ﬁxed number of large, medium and small banks.3
Unfortunately the sample choice is biased toward large banks. For example
Germany was represented by 15 banks, 10 of which were large, 3 medium and
2 small. The beneﬁto ft h a tp r o c e d u r ei st h a td a t ac o v e rm u c hl a r g e rp a r to f
market trade than raw number of banks suggest. Some basic statistics of the
sample banks are presented in the table 2.1.
Table 2.1 The sample statistics
Number of banks 71
Average reserves (1) 745,5 Eur mln
Total sample reserves (2) 52.925 Eur mln
Total market reserves (3) 135.907 Eur mln
Average diﬀerence between current account and
reserve requirement (4) 0,4 Eur mln
Standard deviation of (4) 17,2 Eur mln
(1) Average reserves — average current account of sample bank,
(2) Total sample reserves — average sum of all current account balances in the sample,
(3) Total market reserves — average total Eurosystem liquidity in the corresponding period,
(4) (Current account) — (Reserve Requirement)
Source: ECB
First of all, due to the fact that largest banks dominate the sample, the
reserves of analyzed banks (53 Eur bl) constitute almost 40% of total average
market liquidity during that time (135 Eur bl). That also means, the patterns
observed on the Eurosystem will be well reﬂected in my data. For example,
the aggregate deviation of the current account from reserve requirement during
the maintenance period is very close to zero which is a natural implication of
the ECB liquidity supply policy (that is, the market is supplied with just
suﬃcient liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirement). The average volatility
of that deviation is also very small (in the sample its around 2% of the average
current account) which is due to fairly frequent operations that oﬀset changes
to the autonomous liquidity factors which in turn stabilizes the market liquidity
during whole period.
Another illustration of that is ﬁgure 2.1, that presents the average
(across banks and maintenance periods) deviation of current account from
reserve requirement on diﬀerent days of maintenance period. I have also
2I am very grateful to ECB and Nuno Cassola from liquidity management division for
the permission to collect and use the data obtained during the internship that took place in
the period April — June 2006.
3Details on the sample selection can be also found in Kempa (2006).
12included average positive (current account higher than reserve requirement)
and negative deviation value but they do not seem to follow any speciﬁc pattern
apart from the decline in average positive imbalance 20—18 days before the end
of the maintenance period. This decline can be attributed to the aggregate
change in liquidity that was the result of ECB policy during analyzed period,
rather than individual banks.
A more interesting picture emerged once I started to look into the behavior
of accumulated imbalance for average front- and back-loading bank in my
s a m p l e ,p r e s e n t e do nt h eﬁgure 2.2. To plot that ﬁgure I have simply
added all the deviations of current account balance from reserve requirement
that happened since the beginning of maintenance period. The dashed
lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The front-loading bank will exhibit
positive accumulated deviation in the beginning to drop toward the the end of
maintenance period. An opposite eﬀect will be observed for the back-loading
bank.
On an aggregate basis, those two series net each other resulting in very low
accumulated aggregate imbalance (that result can be also obtained analyzing
market data) thus creating an impression that most banks are aiming for
current account value exactly equal to reserve requirement. When looking
at the data however, both positive and negative deviations are increasing until
approximately half of the maintenance period. This might indicate that the
banks are not motivated to ensure their balances are close to the required
reserves. As the end of the maintenance period is drawing closer, the banks
realize the risks of failing to satisfy the requirement (or satisfying early) and
reverse their previous behavior (so for example front-loading bank current
account is falling below required reserves) so couple of days before the end
of maintenance period they end up with accumulated deviation very close to
zero.
An important question needs to be asked in this place, namely is that
deviation signiﬁcant? The maximum value of aggregate deviation from neutral
liquidity is roughly 1.4 Eur bln, with the average reserves covered by the sample
were equal to 745 Eur mln. To illustrate the importance, the bank with that
sort of shortage would have to borrow twice its value of average current account
value in order to immediately bring his reserves to required level. I have no
information about average trade volumes of individual banks, but still it seems
the scale of that deviation can be regarded substantial.
13Figure 2.1 Daily diﬀerence between current account and reserve requirement
Figure 2.2 Accumulated imbalance in the sample
Another issue that might be interesting is the distribution of the deviation
a n di np a r t i c u l a rt h ei m p a c to ft h es i z e of the bank. To analyse that, I have
picked 20 largest and 20 smallest banks from my sample and looked closer at
14their behaviour. Figure 2.3 shows the largest 20 banks and not surprisingly the
results are very similar to the whole market. This is due to the fact that the
sample choice is heavily biased toward large banks. Perhaps more interesting
is ﬁgure 2.4 that presents the accumulated deviation from neutral liquidity for
smallest 20 banks in the sample. The results are not so clear here (note how
wide are conﬁdence regions4) but it seems the banks on average experience
s o m ea g g r e g a t eb a c k - l o a d i n gb e h a v i o r . T h es a m p l es i z ed o e sn o ta l l o wf o r
making any generalisations but this behavior is consistent with the theory and
results presented in Kempa (2006). In this paper I showed that small banks
might be more inclined toward the back-loading it has however no signiﬁcant
impact on the whole market.
Figure 2.3 Accumulated imbalance for large banks
4The conﬁdence regions were computed using number of banks front- or back-loading
and standard deviation of the aggregate positive (negative) deviation across the banks.
15Figure 2.4 Accumulated imbalance for small banks
Figure 2.5 Accumulated imbalance for selected banks
The last question I would like to address is: do individual banks show some
particular inclination toward back- and front-loading? Analysing the data
reveals that there might indeed be a pattern in individual bank behavior. Some
banks tend to be the front-loaders and some other are on average back-loaders
16on a fairly regular basis. There is also a sizable group of banks that follow no
speciﬁc pattern and sometimes are front- and sometimes back-loading. The
illustration to that is ﬁgure 2.5 which pictures average value of deviation for 5
selected banks. This picture is however quite hard to interpret and conclusions
m u s tb ed r a w nw i t hc a r e .F o re x a m p l e ,B a n kCa n dDa r eb o t hl a r g eb a n k s
from the same country but one of them exhibits on average front and other
back-loading behavior. I do not have access to the names of the banks nor
any other data, but this might indicate some additional factors that are bank
speciﬁc might have an impact on its behavior. Those might relate to the
either particular distribution of the daily liquidity ﬂows (for example negative
on average rather than zero) or bank’s characteristics (for example market
power). With no data available, I cannot address those issues in this paper.
The general picture from the analysis in this section seems to indicate
that the banks typically choose to pick the reserves value that is only loosely
related to the required reserves. Due to the fact that interbank market is
closed, some banks front-loading must cause its counter-parties to back-load,
which is reversed toward the end of the maintenance period, but the individual
deviations from neutral liquidity are quite substantial. Banks seem to be
heterogeneous in a sense that some exhibit preference toward back- and other
front- loading but it does not seem to be related to their size or country of
origin but rather some unobserved characteristics.
3 Standard model
In this section I introduce the standard model of the interbank market based
on Poole (1968) and later extensions to the version with averaging provision
by Välimäki (2003) and Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006). In
the next section, 4. I am going to introduce and motivate several modiﬁcations
but the basic structure will remain very similar.
The starting point of the model is a commercial bank that minimises the
cost of funding and needs to satisfy reserve requirement. It can obtain the funds
either from open market operations, interbank market or standing facilities.
Open market operations take form of tenders (at least in the Eurosystem)
allotting liquidity to highest bidders. Since the funds obtained during liquidity
tenders can be traded away on the interbank market, to prevent arbitrage
opportunities the allotment and market rates must be the close to each other.5
H e n c e ,f r o mt h ec o m m e r c i a lb a n kp e r s p e c t i v ei ts h o u l dm a k en od i ﬀerence if
the funds are obtained from the central bank or the market (in practice the
collateral requirements diﬀers a bit). Therefore in the model I focus on two
sources of funding: interbank market and standing facilities.
The timing of the model is the following. Each bank starts the day with a
current account balance mt and deﬁciency (remaining reserve requirement) dt.
mt,d t ϕt bt εt mt+1,d t+1 − −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
5A model of the relationship between the open market operations and interbank interest
rate has been constructed by Välimäki (2006).
17During the trading day, the bank faces both expected and unexpected
liquidity changes based on its customers payment decisions. Those transactions
were discussed in detail in the section 2.1 above and here I am interested in the
part of them that has not been anticipated before. They are denoted ϕt and
the bank is still able to oﬀset them during the interbank trade by choosing
the value of bt(positive bt means the bank is borrowing). After the trading
day is over, the bank might face late liquidity shock εt that will be the ﬁnal
contribution to the end of the day balance.
In the remaining part of the paper I assume both early and late shocks
are identically and independently distributed with mean zero and constant
standard deviation. In the simulation study in section 4.2 I have normalised
the shocks to follow normal distribution. Let me spend some time discussing
this assumption. First of all, some banks are perhaps more likely to be hit by
positive and other by negative shocks. There might be also connection between
early and later shock realisation, but this is likely to be determined by factors
such as individual bank characteristics, that are beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the variance of the early shock might in reality be higher comparing
to late one; the scale of the unexpected customer-driven transactions is much
larger than random errors in processing. Diﬀerentiating the variance of the
shock does not however introduce any new mechanism in place while it greatly
complicates the computations due to the curse of dimensionality.
The ﬁnal end of the day balance on the current account is then mt + ϕt +
bt + εt. If that expression turns negative, the bank needs to borrow from the
standing facilities. If positive, its either used to satisfy the reserve requirement
or deposited at the central bank (if all the reserve requirement has been already
satisﬁed). The equation of motion for deﬁciency is





dt−1 if mt + ϕt + bt + εt < 0
dt−1 − mt − ϕt − bt − εt if 0 <m t + ϕt + bt + εt <d t−1
0 if mt + ϕt + bt + εt >d t−1
(3.2)
where R is the starting value of reserve requirement.
I nt h es t a n d a r dm o d e las i n g l ep e r i o dc o s tf u n c t i o nK for commercial bank
takes the following form
Kt = itbt + E(ct) (3.3)
At the interest rate it t h ec o s to fb o r r o w i n gf r o mt h ei n t e r b a n km a r k e ti s
itbt. E(ct) is the expected cost of standing facilities E(ct) that are used when
the bank balance either falls below zero or exceeds the remaining part of the
reserve requirement.
Since the bank can choose when to satisfy the reserve requirement, the
problem has a dynamic nature captured by the following Bellman’s equation
where V is the value function
min
bt
Vt = {itbt + E(ct)+E(Vt+1)} (3.4)
18There is no continuation value beyond the end of the maintenance period (we
assume no carryover provision similar to Eurosystem) so the problem on the
last day is slightly diﬀerent and takes the single period form
min
bT
VT = {iTbT + E(cT)} (3.5)
First order conditions6 for equations (3.4) and (3.5) link the optimal borrowing
and the interest rate
iT = i
lF(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)+i
d(1 − F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)) (3.6)
for last day of the maintenance period and
it = i
















for days before. mt denotes assets holdings, bt interbank borrowing (negative
means lending) dt is the remaining part of reserve requirement. F(•) is the
late shock (εt) distribution function and can be interpreted as the probability
of shock realisation falling below the expression in brackets.
T h o s ec o n d i t i o n sh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gi n t e r p r e t a t i o n :a tt h em a r k e tr a t eit
the bank would choose the borrowing value bt so the expected cost of interbank
borrowing (it) is equal to expected cost of using standing facilities and dynamic
cost factor that captures impact of extra unit of deﬁciency on the future cost
of funding.
The demand curves based on above equations are presented on ﬁgure 3.6 In
Kempa (2006) I have used them to draw several interesting observations. The
most important one is perhaps that for the parameter range that resembles
the values used in the Eurosystem, there exists a ﬂat part in the demand
schedule for days before the end of maintenance period. Its interpretation
is following: given that the interest rate is equal to the expected level, the
bank will be indiﬀerent between several borrowing values. This is due to the
fact that for large reserve requirement, the probabilities of using the standing
facilities remain very small, hence the parts (1) and (2) from equation (3.4)
vanish. It can be shown (Kempa, 2006, reproduced in appendix A2.2) that the
last part, the dynamic cost factor value is very close to the expected interest
rate, reducing eq. (3.4) to
it ≈ E(it+1) (3.8)
Intuitively, if the reserves are large enough comparing to the market volatility,
small borrowing changes do not aﬀect the probability of using standing
facilities in the following days as well leaving the expected interest rates
6Proofs of those equations can be found in Kempa (2006) and is reproduced in appendix
A2.1.
19as an alternative cost. This formulation of martingale hypothesis (from
Hamilton, 1996) means however that there is range of bank decisions where
exact borrowing value cannot be uniquely determined and the interest rate
would stay close to the expected level regardless of the market liquidity.
In reality, that view might be somehow questionable. After all, it does seem
the banks are following some speciﬁcp o l i c y .I tm i g h tb ef r o n t - ,b a c k - l o a d i n g
and the data from the sample (from section 2) indicate even that some banks
might constantly change their policies. This is however corrected well before
end of the maintenance period, and cannot be explained using standard model.
In order to address that shortcoming, I will modify the original proﬁte q u a t i o n













































































































































Figure 3.1 Standard model demand curves
4M a r k e t f r i c t i o n s
The standard proﬁt function assumes that the banks are risk neutral hence
they care only for their absolute cost value. That assumption was key to the
martingale hypothesis, that stated the funds on diﬀerent days of maintenance
period are perfect substitutes. In reality however banks might have other
additional motives, when deciding on the borrowing value. In this section, I
will explore the implications of banks trying to avoid excess volatility of their
costs as well as certain asymmetry in the ﬁnancing cost, referred to as market
frictions in the remaining of the paper.
In the standard setup with risk neutrality, a scheme where one covers cost
of several small borrowing operation with one-time revenues from lending is
entirely possible. Consider now a following scenario where an individual bank
lends almost all available resources (back-load) postponing satisfaction of the
reserve requirement until the the last day of the maintenance period. If the rate
20of borrowing and lending transactions is the same bank makes zero loss. The
data from the sample I examined oﬀer no indication such a behavior actually
happens. Even though there is a number of banks front- and back- loading,
they already reverse their behavior at latest around the middle of the corridor
system, indicating they are willing to avoid large transactions on last days of
maintenance period.
There are several possible explanations of this behavior and here I focus
on two of them.
First, I address the possibility that banks want to avoid excess variation in
the cost of ﬁnancing from the market. That means, smaller scale transactions
are preferred over large ones, even though they might sometimes results in
lending one day just to borrow the day after.
Second, the market is subject to several risks including the probability of
insolvency. Since bad loans are signaled by outﬂow of liquidity from the bank,
bid for excess amounts of liquidity might be interpreted by others as indication
of potential problems. This transfers into higher risk premiums charge in the
unsecured market and in extreme case — refusal to trade.
In secured market the transactions between participants are backed by
collateral which oﬀers extra security but gives rise to another risk: the
valuation of the underlying assets might change. This risk is asymmetric as
it eﬀects more borrowing than lending transactions. It is due to the fact that
transition price captures both current market conditions (aggregate liquidity,
expectations etc) and the quality of collateral used, and the last factor might
be in some cases much more important.
In case of repo transaction, extra large borrowing of individual bank
might expend its quality collateral and its trading parties will demand higher
premiums for lower quality securities. Similar eﬀect occurs when the valuation
of the collateral drops, for example due to the crash on stocks markets.
That means, excess borrowing might likely force the bank to trade at very
unfavorable prices.
On the other hand, even though the market is closed, there are no dominant
players that could corner it.7 Thus single bank surplus of liquidity does not
necessarily mean signiﬁcant shortages at its corresponding parties that will
continue to use their regular quality collateral. Hence the transaction price is
very likely to stabilise around average market price.
This asymmetry might have implications for the behavior of the commercial
banks. Depending how large is the pool of available collateral, the banks might
exhibit larger or smaller propensity to maintain surplus amounts of reserves,
especially at times of ﬁnancial distress.
7To see that, ﬁrst recall there is no dominant player on that market: the average total
liquidity in the sample period was 150 Eur bln, while average bank (and sample was biased
toward large banks) reserves were 750 Eur mln. The HHI ratio calculated over current
accounts (which can be used to estimate market power) was very low and only 0.04.
214.1 Model
In this section I construct the cost function that satisﬁes the properties
described above. I assumed that the commercial bank has only two choices
how to obtain funds. First, it can use the central bank standing facilities and
I denote cost of using them by ct. Second, it can use the interbank market
which is a function of the interest rate it and borrowing volume bt. I denote
that function by κ(it,b t), so total cost function is
Kt = κ(it,b t)+E(ct) (4.1)
Total cost function Kt captures the cost of ﬁnancing from both those sources.
Financing from the market is a function of interbank market rate and
borrowing value denoted κ(it,b t) and expected cost of using standing facilities
is E(ct) with exact expression given by (A2.1). Those two terms have quite
diﬀerent properties and I will discuss them separately.
Financing from the market





∂κ(it,b t +  )
∂(bt +  )
(4.2)
for all bt and positive  .
In order to capture asymmetric trading cost (borrowing more costly than
lending), the cost function must satisfy
κ(it,b t) > −κ(it,−bt) (4.3)
for any bt > 0.
It is easy to see that both properties are satisﬁed for any non-decreasing,











κ(it,0) = 0 (4.6)
22Those are not particularly restrictive conditions and in fact they can
be captured by any quadratic function. The same results and easier
computational burden can be also obtained by the following formulation
κ(it,b t)=ρ
−1 exp(ρitbt) (4.7)
This functional form directly satisﬁes conditions (4.4) and (4.5) Adding
constant term (−ρ−1)w o u l db r i n gi ti nl i n ew i t hc o n d i t i o n( 4 . 6 )w i t hn oi m p a c t
on the model results. There are several additional restrictions that are not
necessary (for example the maximum lending cannot exceed available assets)
which are discussed later on, in the simulation description. The parameter ρ
captures how signiﬁcant trading costs are and I discuss its role later on.
Financing from the central bank
Commercial bank can also choose to ﬁnance through standing facilities. In the


















Whenever negative shock realisation exceeds current account (term 1.) the
bank needs to use lending facility paying il. If the current account balance is
higher than required reserves, the surplus is deposited at rate id. The expected
cost E(cT) function is decreasing, convex function of market borrowing value
bt with proofs in appendix A2.3.9




which consists of both terms described before. Note an interesting property of
such a formulation; the cost of obtaining extra euro from the market depends
on the amounts requested and at extreme values can reach very high level. On
the other hand, obtaining the same euro from the central bank cost always
8It is slightly diﬀerent for last day as presented in appendix A2.1.
9Intuitively, the more bank borrows from the market, the more likely the use of deposit
facility which reduces cost of central bank ﬁnance.
To see convexity, note that ﬁrst order condition is just inverted function (3.7). plotted
on ﬁgure 3.1 and is clearly increasing. Also note that the derivative becomes eﬀectively ﬂat
at extreme low or high values of borrowing when the probability of using standing facility
converges to unity. At that point extra unit of funds lent (borrowed) in the market results
in exactly same increase in the use of standing facilities oﬀered at ﬁxed rates.
23the same (il). This means that in certain situations banks might prefer to
choose central bank ﬁnance rather than using the market. When that exactly
happens, depends on the parameters such as relative cost of standing facilities
(spread between lending and deposit one) or degree of market frictions ρ.
Since total cost is sum of two convex functions, to solve for the optimal





For the days before end of RMP, the ﬁrst order condition takes form
it exp(ρitbt)=i
















The proofs are very similar to the standard model and are presented in
the appendix A2.3. The interpretation of those equations is very similar to
standard model equations (3.6) and (3.7) In fact the right-hand side remains
unchanged, as the expected cost of using standing facilities is the same. The
market rate on the left-hand side is however modiﬁed by additional term, which
follows
exp(ρitbt) > 1 for bt > 0 (4.11)
and
exp(ρitbt) < 1 for bt < 0 (4.12)
I come back to that equations in the next section, when I use them to explain
the results obtained in the simulation.
Finally plotting the demand functions in manner similar to the ones above
has been presented on ﬁgure 4.1. Those seem very similar, although note that
all ﬂat parts of the graph become steep. This oﬀers early indication that the





















































Figure 4.1 Demand curves with market frictions
4.2 Simulation
To verify the behavior of the whole market, I run a simulation of 10 day
maintenance period with 10 homogeneous banks in the market. I assume
both early ϕt and εt shocks are identically and independently distributed,
approximated by normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
10% of the starting current account value. I assume any aggregate inﬂow
and outﬂow of liquidity is adjusted in the open market operations, hence the
sum of the shocks is normalised to be always zero. Given the distribution
assumption (mean zero) this is not restrictive assumption. On the last day of
the maintenance period additional ﬁne tuning operations are performed, that
correct for possible aggregate liquidity shortage (or surplus) from the use of
standing facilities. For comparison I have also tried an experiment, and run
the simulation with an aggregate shortage of funds for the whole maintenance
period, that was corrected (by the central bank intervention) on the last day
which is discussed in more details below.
Ih a v ev e r i ﬁed 3 values of parameter ρ1 =1 0 −2, ρ2 =1 0 −3, ρ3 =1 0 −5.
T h o s ew e r ec h o o s e nq u i t ea r b i t r a r i l y ,b a s e do nt h eg r i ds i z ea n dt h er e l a t i v e
size of assets. The value of the the parameter might seem small but recall
the whole product (ρitbt) must be considered together as it enters ﬁrst order
conditions exponentially. Observe the right side of the equation (4.10) is a
number between il and id which is typically linked very closely to market rate
expectations. The left side is the market rate it multiplied by a factor: to keep
those two close the factor must be close to 1, or the expression (ρitbt)close to
zero. I return to that issue in more detail below.
25The target rate of the central bank is 2.50%, which is in the middle of
the standing facilities rate (2.0% and 3.0 % accordingly). Those rates were
actually used by the ECB for majority of 2001—2003. Banks are homogeneous,
with the average reserve requirement set to 100 units.
Finally, following empirical results of the interbank interest rate, I have
assumed the martingale hypothesis holds, that is
it = E(it+1)
Given that the central banks are able to control the end of the day interest
rate by adjusting liquidity I have used that assumption to set the expectations
of the interest rate at the central bank target level. In some of the scenarios
I present later I ﬁnd that the actual average (across simulations) market rate
slightly deviates from this level however the exact mechanism shaping banks
expectations is beyond scope of this work. Maintaining this assumption in
place allows to greatly simplify some of the calculations.
The results of the simulation are presented in table A1.1. Diﬀerent
columns present data for the scenarios with changing parameter ρ and liquidity
shortage. Numbers 1—10 stand for days of the maintenance period. From the
top of the table, I include the information about average interest rate, rate
volatility (across simulations), total market accumulated negative and positive
deviation from neutral liquidity (so the averages would be proportionally
smaller). To obtain last data for the ﬁrst day I have calculated the simple
diﬀerence between the current account (after interbank trade) and average
required reserve requirement (just the same as I did for my sample). For the
following days, I have simply accumulated the diﬀerences from 1st day of the
maintenance period and divided them into those with positive (+) and negative
(-) deviations. Reported values are averages across simulations.
Observation 1 At the low level of market frictions banks do not keep
the current account on the average required reserves level.
This result was obtained for low levels of market frictions, for ρ =1 0 −5 and
lower, which corresponds to third column in table A1.1 and scenario marked
‘low’ on ﬁgure 4.2.
26Figure 4.2 Deviation from reserve requirement
Inspection of the table and ﬁg u r er e v e a l st h a tf o rt h em o s to ft h ep e r i o d ,t h e
imbalances (deviation from neutral liquidity) increase meaning the banks do
not fully adjust for the liquidity shock. The timing of these changes depends
on the parameter ρ value and in my example it takes place on 8th day. At that
point, the banks realise that in order to satisfy the required reserves they would
have to either use the standing facilities or engage in substantial market trade,
both of which are expensive. Since the penalty for borrowing (comparing to
lending) is fairly small at this level of frictions, demand of one group matches
supply of other and the interest rate remains at stable level.
This result can be also obtained by simple manipulations of the equation
(4.10). copied here for convenience
it exp(ρitbt)=i















During the maintenance period, when both the reserve buﬀer dt −bt −mt and
current account mt+bt are very high comparing to shock variance, probability
of shock exceeding those values is very low hence terms (1) and (2) from the







The remaining expression on the right hand side reﬂects the future value of
satisfying the reserve requirement early. At the start of the maintenance
27period, even relatively larger deviations from the average reserve requirement,
do not change the probabilities of using standing facilities in the future hence
the term on RHS is close to the expected market rate. Formal proofs are
included in appendix A2.2. Intuitively, if the bank does not have to worry
about standing facilities or trade restrictions, it can lend extra euro at the
market interest rate. Similar to the martingale hypothesis from above, this
leads to:
it exp(ρitbt) ≈ E(it+1) (4.14)
If the arbitrage hypothesis is valid, the market rate it follows closely the
expected level, at the optimal borrowing
exp(ρitbt) ≈ 1 (4.15)
or
(ρitbt) ≈ 0 (4.16)
which means ρbt , should be close to zero. Large value of ρ implies restrictions
on the trade volume must be small, as discussed below. In case of small ρ
however, market frictions do not restrict the trade volume in signiﬁcant way.
That means the banks can avoid even relatively small trading costs knowing
they will be able to compensate on last days of maintenance period.
Toward the end of the maintenance period, front-loading banks will ﬁnd the
probability of depleting all reserve requirement and consequent use of deposit
facility higher. That will drive the right hand side of the equation (4.13) toward
deposit rate, below the expected market rate. In order for the martingale
hypothesis to hold,
it exp(ρitbt) >E (it+1) (4.17)
or
exp(ρitbt) < 1 (4.18)
and
bt < 0 (4.19)
In other words, the banks start to lend more in the market thus reverting
slowly to neutral liquidity status, which is indeed observed in the market.
Similar reasoning holds of course for back-loading bank and can be used to
explain the reverse in trend in accumulated positive and negative deviation.
The interpretation of this scenario is following. Costs related to market
frictions and trade encourage banks to avoid ‘noise’ trade. Sometimes
temporary liquidity shortage can turn into surplus after several shock
realisations, and early transactions would have to be reversed by the end of
the period, which generates cost. On the other hand, even low ρ value still
means large transactions are relatively more expensive and hence correcting
the deviation from neutral liquidity on a single day of the maintenance period
is not viable. Hence the adjustment process takes actually couple of days and
starts a bit earlier.
28Observation 2 At the high level of market frictions, banks substantially
reduce trade volume
This result holds for the high values of parameter ρ, such as 0.01 used in
this example. At this point, the trading in the market becomes less favorable
comparing to borrowing (or lending) from the central bank. Intuitively, the
cost of using standing facilities is capped, while the cost of market ﬁnance
scales with trade volume. That means, there must exist some maximum
borrowing/lending values depending on the relative cost of market frictions.
Those can be found using ﬁrst order condition (4.10) copied here once again
it exp(ρitbt)=i















The right side of the equation is a probability weighted average of three terms
in total resulting in a number between il and id.I ti sn o wp o s s i b l et oﬁnd the
values of bt at which the left side of the equation is equal to those boundaries.
For maximum lending value, the proﬁts from market must be higher than











For the values used in the simulation: ρ =0 .01, id =2and the interest
rate in the middle of corridor system it =2 .5 the maximum trade volume
the bank can lend bd
t ≥− 8.9 and corresponding maximum borrowing is bl
t ≤
7.2. Those values are below the standard deviation of the liquidity shock
(σ =1 0 ) which means very likely they will become binding. That however
means the imbalance is going to continue all the way including last day of the
maintenance period. In addition, without balancing trade some banks will ﬁnd
themselves spending their reserve requirement buﬀer early forcing them to use
deposit facility. Since those restrictions will also hold on the last day of the
m a i n t e n a n c ep e r i o d ,t h ei m b a l a n c ew i l ln o tb ec o r r e c t e du n t i lt h ee n do ft h e
maintenance period which will induce substantial use of standing facilities.
Finally high value of ρ implies that imbalance between borrowing and
lending will be substantial. Using the example from paragraph above,
maximum borrowing is 20% lower than maximum lending which has the
impact on the behavior of interest rate. Intuitively, costs of market borrowing
are higher than proﬁts from corresponding market lending and the potential
standing facilities much more attractive. Hence, to induce market trade and
attract those banks, the interest rate in the market must be lower than in a
risk neutral case, which is what is in fact observed in column 2 of table A1.1.
29Observation 3 At the medium level of market frictions banks follow the
average required reserves level
Using intermediate parameter value ρ =0 .001 produced a very interesting
outcome that has been marked as medium on ﬁgure 4.2. What happens is
banks are actually reverting their daily ﬂuctuations of liquidity (from shocks)
maintaining stable account value which is very close to the average required
reserves. This can be explained in a following way. Contrary to the scenario
with low trade frictions, adjusting on the last day of the maintenance period
requiring single massive transaction is very costly and hence banks try to avoid
it. On the other hand, smaller values of trade are not penalized to the extend
presented above, in the scenario with high ρ,a n dﬁnancing from the central
bank is still more costly than market ﬁnance. Hence, banks ﬁnd that the most
proﬁtable scenario is to remain in safe range, where the costs of daily trade
during whole period are lower than cost of one large market transaction on
last day or using standing facilities.
Observation 4 No liquidity eﬀect in the market
Recall that one of the most important issues for the central bankers is the
strength of the liquidity eﬀects, as it oﬀers a link between market reserves
(controlled in open market operations) and market rate. In the empirical
w o r k so fM o s c h i t z( 2 0 0 4 )a n dW ü r t z( 2 0 0 3 )t h el i q u i d i t ye ﬀects was found
only on last days of the maintenance period. In my model I ﬁnd conﬁrmation
and explanation for that result.
To analyse the impact of liquidity in the market I have run the simulation
imposing an aggregate shortage of liquidity in the market (total value of it
was 150 units comparing to market liquidity 1000 units). The shortage is
corrected by the central bank on the last day of the maintenance period so
the expected interest rate remained on constant level. I used the parameter
ρ =1 0 −6 but results do not change for higher ρ values. This value is used as
results resemble the actual behavior of the Eurosystem as discussed below. The
results are reported in the last column of table A1.1. and perhaps surprisingly
do not diﬀer from the standard case.10
To understand that ﬁndings, ﬁrst observe that in my model the demand for
funds is uniquely determined. That means, the banks always choose speciﬁc
borrowing value rather than remain indiﬀerent within speciﬁc range (as was
the case in standard model). This result should not be surprising. In both
risk neutral and my model the right side of equation (3.7) is not changing for
a range of borrowing values. In my construction however the trade volume
also enters left side of (3.7) and even small change in borrowing changes it
substantially. That means the value of borrowing that would match both sides
is unique.
To see how the market liquidity aﬀects the interest rate in the model let







10Apart from the obvious imbalance between front- and back-loading banks.
30The right side captures the dynamic cost factor or the probability of using
standing facilities in the future. With relatively high reserve requirement (as
is the case in the Eurosystem) those probabilities are very low and that term
remains very close to the expected interest rate level at wide range of not
only borrowing (bt) but also the assets (mt) and deﬁciency (dt) values (see
Kempa, 2006, for details). At the same time, the last two terms do not enter
t h el e f ts i d eo ft h ee q u a t i o n .T h a tm e a n st h eb o r r o w i n gd e c i s i o nw i l lr e m a i n
very similar for range of assets and deﬁciency realisations at least at the start
of the maintenance period. If the borrowing decisions stay same, so does the
interest rate which leads to the following conclusion: the market liquidity has
little eﬀect on the interest rate. This means the expectations of the future
interest rate remain key determinant of the current rate, which is also the
result obtained for standard model.
Intuitively, this comes from the fact that banks are balancing the cost of
ﬁnancing from the market and central bank. Large reserve requirement or
long maintenance period means that current liquidity has little impact on the
future use of standing facilities; there is plenty of time to revert positive or
negative position. Provided the expected rate does not change much (as it was
the case in the Eurosystem for much of the time between 2003—2006) there
was no need for excessive and potentially costly borrowing actions even when
faced with substantial liquidity shortages or surpluses.
This is potentially very important result for the central bankers, as it
shows the implementation of the monetary policy should be more focused on
controlling expectations rather that market liquidity.
The results presented above represent the key contribution of the paper.
There is however several other issues that should be addressed as well, related
to the key parameter ρ that measures the impact of trading frictions on the
behavior of the commercial bank.
First of all, diﬀerent values of parameter seem to induce diﬀerent bank
behavior. For high values of ρ increasing cost becomes quite important and
banks are more reluctant to engage into to any trade turning to standing
facilities instead. The exact numbers might be misleading, as they depend on
the values of parameters used (such as reserves volume), but for comparison I
ﬁnd that for parameter value ρ =0 ,01 the banks refrain from any trade almost
until the last day of the maintenance period (scenario marked ‘high’ on the
ﬁgure 4.2). As the value of ρ decreases, so does the cost of daily trade and
oﬀsetting the shocks on a daily basis becomes viable option. Until ρ reaches
very low level, adjusting to the required reserves in single transaction still is
still very expensive and banks ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to plan in advance to
avoid it. This becomes less an issue at parameter values around ρ =1 0 −5
where the convexity of the cost function almost vanishes.
Second is the issue how closely the market rate follows the central bank
target which is implemented as expected future rate. Inspection of table A1.1
reveals that central bank goal is easily met for low and intermediate parameter
v a l u e sb u tt h em a r k e td e v i a t e sq u i t eab i ta th i g hv a l u e so fρ.A tt h i sp o i n t ,t h e
asymmetry between cost of borrowing and proﬁts from lending become quite
substantial and market clearing rate needs to adjust downward to compensate
31for that. Intuitively, the banks with liquidity shortage are not as eager to
borrow as the banks with surplus want to lend.
Finally one should compare the results of the simulations with the actual
behavior of the Eurosystem. The analysis presented above is subject to several
assumptions (such as bank homogeneity etc) yet it seems that out of three
scenarios presented, the one with low level of market frictions seems to be the
closest. First, it successfully replicates the pattern where the initial deviation
from the target rate increases to drop in the later part of the maintenance
period. Second, the interest rate remains closely tied to the central bank
target or expected level, which was the actual behavior of Eonia in analysed
period.
4.3 Section summary
The model presented in this section is a standard model of the interbank
trade modiﬁed to include the asymmetry between borrowing and lending
and potential market frictions related costs. I have then run a Monte-Carlo
simulation for diﬀerent parameters ρ value and I found I can duplicate some
of the patterns observed on the Eurosystem market for relatively low level of
t h em a r k e tf r i c t i o n s :
• The banks that initially deviate from the neutral liquidity, return to the
required level later on during the maintenance period
• T h e r ei sn ol i q u i d i t ye ﬀect in the market
Those can be interpreted in a following way. Early on, banks reduce their
daily trade volumes in order to avoid market related costs. The adjustment
to the required level takes place in the second part of the maintenance period,
rather than on single day day, suggesting increasing cost of large transactions.
Comparing those results to the Eurosystem can lead to some interesting
insights. It seems the market is subject to some trade related costs that are
suﬃciently high to encourage banks to reduce their transactions volumes early
in the maintenance period. However the level of borrowing where the banks
would have to incur extra expenses is realistically never reached, either due
to market depth or the fact that banks in reality start to adjust for liquidity
shortage/surplus a bit earlier than in the simulation. This is safe scenario
from the perspective of the ECB, as the market rate tends to stabilise around
expected level.
The second result have potential interesting implications for the central
bank policy. Given the risk of using the standing facilities is small during the
maintenance period, banks trading decisions are more aﬀected by the expected
interest rate level rather than their current liquidity. This is perhaps not a new
ﬁnding and was indeed stated already by Välimäki (2003) and Kempa (2006)
that analyse risk neutral case. This paper extends that results into more robust
case where banks are facing certain limitations and market frictions.
Central banks could use that ﬁndings when deciding about frequency and
scale of the liquidity supply operations. It seems that even if the central bank
32supplies liquidity over or below benchmark level, the market rate will remain
unaﬀected. Alternatively, more frequent (and thus exact) operations would
not aﬀect the interest rate level as well. This gives central bank some room
for potential errors, but on the other hand complicates its job if the interest
rate expectations run out of control.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper deals with the interbank market and bank’s demand for reserves. I
start with a brief introduction to the market mechanism and illustrate some of
them using 71 banks sample from the Eurosystem. Contrary to popular belief,
the commercial banks do not strictly follow the required reserves level on each
day of the maintenance period. Some of them also exhibit propensity to front-
and back-load (satisfy requirement early or late). This does not seem to be
dependent on their size or country of origin.
Using modiﬁcation of the standard model of the interbank market derived
by Poole (1968) and Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2006) I then
show how market related frictions can be used to explain that pattern. It seems
that in the beginning of the maintenance period, banks are slow with reacting
to liquidity changes. With high reserve requirement buﬀer, banks prefer to
postpone adjustments reducing the cost involved with interbank trade. As the
end of the maintenance period gets closer, the threat of being forced to use the
standing facilities becomes more credible and banks are more willing to trade
and revert to the neutral liquidity level. Instead of postponing that process
until the very last day of the period banks choose to spread it avoiding large
transactions that are likely to incur extra expenses. That suggests, both daily
operational expenses and increasing marginal transactions costs are important
in banks’ decision making.
At the Eurosystem level of frictions, banks’ individual patterns in the
reserves demand seem to have little impact on the level of the interest rate.
Indeed I ﬁnd that the interest rate remains on a level very close to the expected
with little volatility and the aggregate liquidity does not seem to aﬀect it
substantially. That is also somehow related to previous paragraph: if the banks
trade volumes are only loosely connected to their individual liquidity (at least
at the start of maintenance period banks do not fully respond to shocks), even
aggregate shortage or surplus will have little impact. That is however assuming
banks believe it will be corrected by the end of the maintenance period.
Those ﬁndings have speciﬁc policy applications. The central bankers
control over the interest rate is exerted mainly through expectations channel
rather than market liquidity. This is due to the fact that given the required
reserves are high comparing to the volatility banks face, the probability of
actually using standing facilities for commercial bank is very low.
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Table A1.1 Simulation results
Average rate on day ρ =1 0 −2 ρ =1 0 −3 ρ =1 0 −5 liquidity shortage
1 2,50 2,50 2,50 2,50
2 2,49 2,50 2,50 2,50
3 2,47 2,50 2,50 2,50
4 2,47 2,50 2,50 2,50
5 2,46 2,50 2,50 2,50
6 2,45 2,50 2,50 2,50
7 2,45 2,50 2,50 2,50
8 2,44 2,49 2,50 2,50
9 2,45 2,49 2,50 2,50
10 2,38 2,46 2,50 2,50
Rate volatility on day
1 0,031 0,000 0,000 —
2 0,030 0,003 0,000 —
3 0,030 0,003 0,000 —
4 0,030 0,004 0,000 —
5 0,038 0,006 0,000 —
6 0,044 0,009 0,000 —
7 0,052 0,011 0,000 —
8 0,058 0,017 0,001 —
9 0,074 0,027 0,002 —
10 0,093 0,076 0,000 —
Accumulated positive deviation
1 51,5 41,6 49,4 0,00
2 108,0 56,8 94,9 0,05
3 177,2 70,6 147,8 0,10
4 254,3 78,8 207,6 0,42
5 342,5 85,5 271,6 0,77
6 438,9 89,4 338,7 1,47
7 541,3 92,2 404,4 2,00
8 650,7 94,9 463,9 0,15
9 770,0 94,5 455,4 0,00
10 1109,4 101,4 40,5 41,2
continued...
35... continues
Accumulated negative deviation ρ =1 0 −2 ρ =1 0 −3 ρ =1 0 −5 liquidity shortage
1 -49,4 -41,6 -46,9 -157,0
2 -105,9 -56,8 -92,3 -307,4
3 -175,1 -70,6 -145,2 -457,6
4 -252,2 -78,8 -204,9 -606,7
5 -340,4 -85,5 -268,6 -753,0
6 -436,9 -89,3 -334,8 -898,4
7 -539,5 -92,3 -399,2 -1045,4
8 -649,1 -94,9 -458,1 -1192,1
9 -768,7 -94,5 -447,8 -1340,9
10 -727,4 -98,9 -40,3 -41,2
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Proofs
A 2 . 1P r o o fo fr e s u l t sf r o ms e c t i o n3
Those proofs of the standard model follow almost exactly the ones presented
in Kempa (2006).
The expected cost of using standing facilities for the last day of maintenance















l(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
− i











Substituting that equation into cost function (3.5)
VT = iTbT + E(cT)
and solving the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to bT yields
−iT = −i
lF(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
+ i
l(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
− i
d(1 − F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT))
− i
d(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
− i
l(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
+ i
d(mT + bT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT) (A2.2)
which can be simpliﬁed to
iT = i
lF(−mT −bT −ϕT +dT)+i
d(1−F(−mT −bT −ϕT +dT)) (A2.3)
¥
For days before the last one, the cost function can be rewritten using expected
cost of using standing facilities:
Et(Vt)=itbt − i
l(mt + bt + ϕt)F(−mt − bt − ϕt)
− i














37The ﬁrst order conditions
it = i
lF(−mt −bt −ϕt)+i




To calculate the last element of the the F.O.C. ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h eb o r r o w i n g
maturity is one period, hence it has no direct impact on the asset value and
borrowing in the next period. It has however impact on the deﬁciency value,
which must be analysed in 3 separate cases:
1. The shock forces the bank to use lending facility meaning the deﬁciency
remains unchanged.
2. The shock forces the bank to use deposit facility meaning all deﬁciency
gets satisﬁed.
3. The intermediate case, where the shock value only lowers the deﬁciency
without forcing the bank to use any of the facilities
In ﬁrst two cases, the deﬁciency either remains unchanged (comparing to
previous period) or drops to zero, meaning the borrowing decision has no



















In the last case, whenever the deﬁciency is carried over one period, one more



















L e a d i n gt op r o ﬁt maximising conditions:
it = i
lF(−bt − mt − ϕt)+i








38A2.2 Proofs of the martingale property from section 3.
To prove the martingale property used in section 3 start with the equilibrium
interest rate
it = i
















As discussed in the paper, terms (1) and (2) converge to zero when the reserve







The derivative of the value function with respect to deﬁciency can be solved
using an envelope theorem ( ∂Vt







Since the probability of using lending facility is not aﬀected by the deﬁciency























d {(1 − F(−mt − bt − ϕt + dt))
+( mt + bt + ϕt − dt)f(−mt − bt − ϕt + dt)









In a manner similar to above we analyse 3 cases:


























The intermediate case, where the shock value only lowers the deﬁciency without
























If the current account balance is high comparing to the size of the liquidity


















d(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)(1 − F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT))
− i

















d [(1 − F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)) + (mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)]
+i
l [F(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT) − (mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)]
− i
d(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT)
+ i
l(mT + bT + ϕT − dT)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT) (A2.20)












so the dynamic cost factor is equal to the expectations of the future interest
rate.
A2.3 Proofs of results from section 4.1.





F o re x a m p l ef o rl a s td a yo ft h em a i n t e n a n c ep e r i o dT Ih a v ec a l c u l a t e da b o v e



















d)f(−mT − bT − ϕT + dT) > 0
To prove equations (4.9) and (4.10) note that expression for expected cost of
using standing facilities E(ct) remains unchanged. Hence the most complicated
part of the proofs presented in the section above remains the same.
The only expression that changes is cost of funding from the interbank
market κ(it,b t) w h i c hw a sg i v e nb yitbt in the standard model and ρ−1 exp(ρitbt)
in the presented model.




To prove the ﬁrst order conditions (4.9) and (4.10) one needs to exactly repeat
the steps from above section changing the marginal cost of ﬁnance from the
market from it into it exp(ρitbt).
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